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A BLOW TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS: APPLYING
THE "TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS" TEST IN
CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
MELISSA MOODY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court struck a fatal blow to 'victimless' domestic
violence prosecutions1 with its recent decision in Crawford v.
Washington.2 In Crawford, the Court held that the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment requires witnesses to appear in
court.3 Specifically, the Court held that in order for an unavailable
witness's testimony to be admissible, the defendant must have
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.4 This holding,
which overruled precedent set twenty-four years earlier in Ohio v.
Roberts,5 was framed against the history of ex parte abuses that
were made famous by Sir Walter Raleigh's trial for treason.6
Unfortunately, Sir Walter Raleigh's story has little to do with the
stories of domestic violence victims and ex parte abusers. The lack
of guidance from the Court regarding the proper application of its
'new and improved' Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has resulted
in a disturbing number of inconsistent holdings throughout the
United States.7 More disturbing than the sheer number of
inconsistencies, however, is the fact that the Court's academically
* The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not
represent those of the Idaho Office of the Attorney General. The author would like to thank
Steven Clymer for sharing his passion and vast knowledge of the criminal law. His lessons
continue to inspire.
1. 'Victimless' prosecutions rely on evidence from sources other than victim testimony
when, as is often the case, the domestic violence victim is unable or unwilling to testify. For
a discussion of this type of evidence-based prosecution, see Cory Adams, Deterring Domestic
Violence: Prospects for Heightened Success in the "Victimless" Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Cases, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 51 (2000).
2. 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
3. Id. at 1374.
4. Id.
5. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Roberts held that the test for admitting hearsay evidence was
whether the hearsay evidence was reliable. Id. at 57. Reliability turned on whether the
hearsay evidence "[fell] within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or bore "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness." Id.
6. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1360-63. Justice Scalia's opinion described the seventeenth
century political trial of Sir Walter Raleigh at some length. Id. at 1360-63. Raleigh was falsely
convicted of treason without being afforded the opportunity to confront his accuser. Id. Unlike
the domestic batterer of today who tries every trick in the book to prevent his significant other
from testifying, Raleigh actually urged the court to have his accusers appear before him at
trial. Id.
7. See infra Part II.
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appealing interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation has significantly eroded offender accountability in
domestic violence prosecutions.
Part II of this article briefly summarizes the facts, holding,
and rationale behind the Supreme Court's momentous about-face in
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Part III details numerous
inconsistencies in state court interpretations of Crawford's
intentionally-oblique mandate.8  Part IV discusses how the
Crawford holding binds the hands of prosecutors, as well as
legislators, in taking action to end domestic violence. Finally,
Part V seeks solutions, arguing that "testimonial" statements
should never include excited utterances or statements to medical
treatment providers.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION IN CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
Michael Crawford stabbed a man who allegedly tried to rape
his wife, Sylvia.9 Sylvia gave the police a statement that
implicated Crawford, but Crawford later invoked the marital
privilege, successfully preventing her from testifying at trial.'0 The
Court allowed the prosecution's admission of evidence in the
form of an audiotape of Sylvia's statement to the police, and the
jury convicted Crawford of assault." The Washington Court of
Appeals reversed, concluding that Sylvia's statement was not
sufficiently trustworthy to warrant admission." The Washington
Supreme Court reinstated Crawford's conviction, unanimously
concluding that Sylvia's statement was reliable and admissible."
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Washington
Supreme Court and remanded the case, holding that the admission
of Sylvia's statement violated Crawford's Sixth Amendment right
8. After setting forth a new test for the admissibility of prior statements that hinges
upon whether the prior statement can accurately be deemed "testimonial," the Court went on
to say "[wle leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of
'testimonial.' Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. The Court recognized that its "refusal to
articulate a comprehensive definition in this case will cause interim uncertainty," but the
Court flippantly dismissed such concerns with the inaccurate observation that this
uncertainty "can hardly be any worse than the status quo." Id. at 1374 n.10.
9. Id. at 1356.
10. Id. at 1357. In the State of Washington, the marital privilege generally bars a spouse
from testifying without the other spouse's consent. WASH. REv. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1994).
11. Id. at 1358.
12. State v. Crawford, No. 25 307-1-I, 2001 WL 850119, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. July 30,
2001).
13. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 664 (2002).
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to confront his accuser. 4 Before arriving at this conclusion, the
Court turned to the historical background of the Confrontation
Clause to understand its meaning, 5 noting that "[t]he Constitution's
text does not alone resolve this case." 6 Writing for the Court,
Justice Scalia discussed the history of civil law examination and
ex parte abuses, including Sir Walter Raleigh's infamous trial
for treason. 7
According to Justice Scalia, the history of the Confrontation
Clause supports two inferences about the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment: "[fiirst, the principal evil at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure,
and particularly its use ofexparte examinations as evidence against
the accused,"" and second, "the Framers would not have allowed
admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear
at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." 9 Simply because
these limitations on hearsay admissibility existed at the time the
Constitution was written, a time when domestic violence was
14. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. Significantly, the Court did not address whether
Crawford waived his right to confrontation by invoking the marital privilege to prevent his
wife from testifying. In a footnote, Justice Scalia wrote:
The [Washington] court rejected the State's argument that guarantees of
trustworthiness were unnecessary since petitioner waived his confrontation
rights by invoking the marital privilege. It reasoned that "forcing the defendant
to choose between the marital privilege and confronting his spouse presents an
untenable Hobson's choice" (quoting State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d, at 660) ... The
State has not challenged this holding here. The State also has not challenged the
Court of Appeals' conclusion (not reached by the State Supreme Court) that the
confrontation violation, if it occurred, was not harmless. We express no opinion
on these matters.
Id. at 1359 n.1.
15. Id. at 1359. It should be apparent that "turn[ing] to the historical background of the
Clause to understand its meaning", id., necessarily prevents consideration of domestic
violence prosecutions in the context of the Confrontation Clause. At the time the United
States Constitution was penned, it was more than acceptable for men to physically abuse
their spouses. See Prentice L. White, Stopping the Chronic Batterer Through Legislation: Will
It Work this Time?, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 709, 715-16 (2004). In fact, one of the first authorities
cited by the Supreme Court on its historical tour de force was Blackstone, a legal scholar who
endorsed and codified "domestic chastisement." White, supra at 715. Domestic chastisement
has been described as the husband's power of correction to modify his wife's behavior as
necessary to uphold the patriarchal family structure. Id. By intentionally limiting the
understanding of the meaning of the Confrontation Clause to a time when women were
treated as chattel and men abused their wives with impunity, constitutional law
jurisprudence will, perhaps unwittingly, prevent a shift toward successful prosecution of
this conduct.
16. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359.
17. Id. at 1359-63.
18. Id. at 1363.
19. Id. at 1365.
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tolerated by the criminal law and encouraged by social mores,2" the
Court concluded neatly that "[t]he Sixth Amendment therefore
incorporates those limitations."2 The effect of this decision is that
for an unavailable witness's hearsay testimony to be admissible at
trial, the defendant must have had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the witness regarding the statement.2 2
While the Court acknowledged some exceptions to the general
exclusion of hearsay evidence, it only recognized exceptions
existing in 1791, at the time of the adoption of the Sixth
Amendment.2 Examples of such exceptions include "business
records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy."2 4 A dying
declaration is also admissible, despite the defendant having been
denied a prior opportunity for cross-examination.25 The Court
emphasized its overarching concern that the "[i]nvolvement of
government officers in the production of testimony with an eye
toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse - a
fact borne out time and again throughout a history with which the
Framers were keenly familiar."26
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor disagreed with
the Court's holding in a dissent framed as a concurrence,
wherein the two Justices reached the same result as the majority.
In reaching the same result, however, Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor were less eager to overrule twenty-four years of
precedent.2" Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
20. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
21. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1366.
22. Id. at 1369.
23. See id. at 1367.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1367 n.6.
26. Id. at 1367 n.7. Unfortunately, the Court seemed more attuned to the unique abuses
of yesterday than the actual current abuse of the criminal justice system by domestic
batterers. Consider the perspective of a public defender:
Scalia either ignores or forgets the sad daily truth of local domestic violence
courtrooms: that ideologically driven judicial decision-making is alive and well
even in run of the mill assault cases. Whether he knew it or not, Scalia has, in
essence, radically shifted the balance of power from prosecutors to reluctant
complainants, giving alleged victims more control over the cases of their own
victimization and greater freedom from the paternalistic philosophy of
prosecution that the Roberts rule enabled. So from now on, when the
complainant in a domestic violence case insists she's not coming to court andjust
wants to drop the charges, I'll just smile as Judge Kiesel says, "Case dismissed."
David Feige, Domestic Silence: The Supreme Court Kills Evidence-Based Prosecution, SLATE,
Mar. 12, 2004, available at httpJ/www.dvmen.orgtdv-57.htm.
27. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. (Rehnquist, J. with O'Connor, J., concurring).
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I believe that the Court's adoption of a new interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause is not backed by sufficiently persuasive
reasoning to overrule long-established precedent. Its decision
casts a mantle of uncertainty over future criminal trials in both
federal and state courts, and is by no means necessary to decide
the present case.28
Chief Justice Rehnquist's words have come to haunt both federal
and state prosecutions, for his predicted "mantle of uncertainty" has
materialized more ominously as a 'gag order on justice."'
III. THE INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF CRAWFORD'S HOLDING
PRODUCES UNDESIRABLE RESULTS
The Crawford Court abandoned the 'reliability' test for
admitting hearsay statements, commenting that "[rleliability is
an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept." ° The Court
replaced the 'reliability' test with an even more amorphous and
subjective test, the "testimonial statements' test.31 Worried that
"judges, like other government officers, could not always be trusted
to safeguard the rights of the people," the Court dutifully followed
in the footsteps of those who "were loath to leave too much
discretion in judicial hands."32 With its decision in Crawford,
the Supreme Court has guaranteed that virtually no discretion
will be left in judicial hands, including the discretion to exercise
common sense. Courts that no longer have this necessary
discretion are struggling mightily to exercise what little evidentiary
discretion they do have with respect to the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment.
While this article focuses on the problems in interpreting the
phrase "testimonial statements" in a domestic violence context, it
is worth noting that courts are attempting, again with inconsistent
results, to interpret other ambiguous phrases from the Crawford
holding. For example, courts do not agree on a single definition of
"opportunity for prior cross-examination."33 Most state courts
28. Id.
29. Id. For one example of the many unreported prosecutions that will never be brought
because of Crawford's holding, see Patrick Walters, Prosecutors Drop Assault Charges Against
Former Boxing Champ Frazier, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Apr. 20, 2004, available
at http://www.signonsandiego.com/sports/20040420-1735-frazier-arrest.html (describinghow
prosecutors had to drop assault charges because the victim refused to testify).
30. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1371.
31. Id. at 1374.
32. Id. at 1373.
33. See cases cited infra note 34.
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have held that probable cause or preliminary hearings 'provide a
satisfactory opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine his
accuser, and testimony given at these hearings will be admissible
at trial if the witness later becomes unavailable. 34 Conversely, the
Supreme Court of Colorado has held that a probable-cause hearing
will not satisfy the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to
confront one's accuser under the Crawford holding.3 5
The 'forfeiture by wrongdoing' doctrine provides another
source of inconsistent post-Crawford caselaw. Some courts have
admitted the hearsay statements of a murder victim, holding
34. E.g., United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that witness
testimony from a prior preliminary hearing held decades earlier was properly admitted at
trial); People v. Ochoa, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a rape victim's
preliminary hearing testimony, in which she recanted statements made to police at the scene
of the crime, was admissible later at trial when she became unavailable by invoking her rights
under the Fifth Amendment, and its admission did not violate the defendant's right to
confrontation because he had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine her at the
preliminary hearing); People v. Cloud, No. 0042386, 2004 WL 1895022 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 25,
2004) (holding that the trial court did not err in admitting preliminary hearing testimony of
a witness who disappeared on the day of trial); People v. Flippin, No. A098086, 2004 WL
1879998 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004) (finding that it was not error to admit the preliminary
hearing testimony of an unavailable witness); People v. Sharpe, No. B169924 2004 WL
1771481 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2004) (affirming that the preliminary hearing testimony of an
unavailable witness was properly admitted at trial, despite the fact that the defendant's
preliminary hearing attorney was not the trial attorney); People v. Price, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a domestic violence victim's preliminary hearing testimony
was admissible at trial where she testified at trial but claimed not to remember any of the
statements made to the officers); People v. Lewis, No. B166379, 2004 WL 928191 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 30, 2004) (deciding that it was not error to admit preliminary hearing testimony of
a witness where the state established due diligence in its attempts to locate the witness);
People v. Martin, No. B161573, 2004 WL 882062 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2004) (holding that
it was not error to admit the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness); State
v. Crocker, 852 A.2d 762 (Conn. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that preliminary hearing testimony
was adequate to satisfy the defendant's right to confrontation); State v. Young, 87 P.3d 308
(Kan. 2004); People v. Stewart, No. 246334, 2004 WL 1778525 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2004)
(indicating that eyewitness testimony from a preliminary hearing was admissible where a
witness refused to testify, despite some suggestion that the witness's preliminary hearing
testimony might have been perjurious); People v. Tincher, No. 246891, 2004 WL 1460687
(Mich. Ct. App. June 29, 2004) (holding that the admission of preliminary hearing testimony
satisfied the Confrontation Clause, where witness could not testify because of a high-risk
pregnancy); People v. Ali Al-Timimi, No. 245211, 2004 WL 1254271 (Mich. Ct. App. June 8,
2004) (holding that observers of the preliminary hearing, including the examining magistrate,
could properly testify at trial regarding their personal observations of the witness's testimony
at the preliminary hearing, where no preliminary hearing transcript was available); State v.
Rossbach, No. 245262, 2004 WL 1178424 (Mich. Ct. App. May 27, 2004) (deciding that an
unavailable witness's statement from the preliminary hearing was properly introduced at
trial because the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination); Primeaux v. State,
88 P.3d 893 (Okla. Crim. 2004).
35. People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004) (holding that preliminary hearing testimony
is not admissible at trial under the Confrontation Clause because the opportunity for cross-
examination is limited to the issue of probable cause and for that reason is insufficient).
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that the defendant forfeited his right to confront his accuser by
doing wrong.3 6 Other courts, however, have interpreted the doctrine
less broadly, requiring an additional link between the defendant
and the cause of action before recognizing a waiverY In these cases, an
additional link may be required to admit even non-testimonial
hearsay statements.' Crawford has also produced caselaw fallout
best categorized as 'decisions that make no sense whatsoever.' 9
The greatest confusion has resulted in the area that is the
subject of this paper: the meaning of the phrase "testimonial
statements."40 In attempts to apply the testimonial statements test,
courts are excluding evidence that should be admitted.4' Further,
36. E.g., State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 794 (Kan. 2004) (holding simply, "a waiver of the
right to confrontation based upon the procurement of the absence of the witness also
constitutes a waiver of any hearsay objections to prior statements of the absent witness");
Francis v. Duncan, No. 03 Civ. 4959 (DC), 2004 WL 1878796 *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2004)
(finding, "[tihe waiver by misconduct rule prevents a defendant from asserting his
confrontation rights to reap the benefits of his own misconduct by precluding former
testimony from being admitted against him").
37. United States v. Mikos, No. 02 CR 137-1, 2004 WL 1631675 (N.D.fll. July 16, 2004)
(refusing to apply the wrongdoing exception because the government did not "convince
the Court by a preponderance of the evidence that [the defendant] killed [the witness]
to prevent her from testifying"); United States v. Hendricks, No. CRIM. 2004-05 F/R, 2004
WL 1125143 *2 (V.I. Apr. 27, 2004) (requiring a "conclusive link" between the victim and
the matter before the court before admitting wiretap evidence in the case of a murdered
confidential informant).
38. Hendricks, 2004 WL 1125143 at *2.
39. E.g., People v. Martin, 2004 WL 882062 (Cal. Ct. App. 2 Dist. April 26, 2004) (citing
the Crawford holding, but seemingly relying on the old Roberts test, admitting the statement
in question on the ground that it was "spontaneous," a category of hearsay among the "firmly
rooted" hearsay exceptions, and therefore admissible); United States v. Taylor, 328 F. Supp.
2d 915 (N.D.Ind. 2004) (analyzing the statement's admissibility under the framework of
Roberts, Lilly, and Crawford, applying the Roberts test, and ultimately determining that the
statement was admissible because it contained "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness," without addressing whether the statement was testimonial); State v.
Midgett, 680 N.W.2d 288 (S.D. 2004) (remarking that it would be counsel's burden to argue
whether the victim's statements to law enforcement were admissible despite the victim's
appearance and testimony at trial). One wonders what argument the appellate court in
Midgett felt was necessary on this subject. The Crawford opinion reiterated that the Sixth
Amendment's right to confrontation is only implicated when the witness does not appear at
trial: "Finally, we reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial,
the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial
statements." Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9.
40. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374.
41. E.g., In re J.KW., Child, No. A03-1650, 2004 WL 1488850 (Minn. Ct. App. July 6,
2004) (holding that statements made by one co-conspirator to another, which were recorded
during a telephone conversation, were testimonial and inadmissible because a police officer
encouraged the recording of the conversation for the purpose of incriminating J.KW.); People
v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Supp. 2004) (prohibiting the admission of the recording of a call
to 911, where the caller described a shooting happening at the time of the call, because
the call was the product of 'interrogation"); United States v. Mikos, No. 02 CR 137-1, 2004
WL 1631675 (N.D.Ill. July 16, 2004) (holding that, where defendant made phone calls to a
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when courts stubbornly insist on admitting hearsay evidence that
they believe should be admitted despite Crawford's exclusion of
testimonial evidence, they must creatively circumvent the Crawford
test with inventive evidentiary rulings.42
Nowhere has the application of the testimonial statements test
been more painfully inconsistent than in the area of domestic
violence. An unreported case from Kentucky provides a good
example of the problems that arise in this context.' Marquis Heard
was convicted of first-degree criminal trespass and second-degree
criminal assault for knocking a door off of its hinges, hitting the
victim, Angel, in the head with the butt of a handgun, and leaving
with the child that belonged to him and the victim. When Angel's
grandmother found her later that same evening, Angel was in a
hysterical state, crying and shouting incoherently.
Angel told a police officer "that Heard had kicked the door
down and that he had hit her in the head with a gun because she
would not let go of her infant child." Angel told the emergency
room physician "that the cuts were the result of being struck with
a pistol."45
Angel did not appear at either of the two trials.46 After Heard
was convicted, he argued "that the trial court violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confront and to cross-examine his accuser
witness to convince her to lie in her testimony and the witness refused and was
subsequently shot, the government was first required to prove, by preponderance of the
evidence, that the defendant murdered the witness before the government could
introduce evidence of the phone calls); Hendricks, 2004 WL 1125143 at *2 (excluding
wiretap evidence in the case of the murder of a confidential informant because the
government was unable to establish a "conclusive link" between the defendant and the
murder, where murder occurred after informant's identity was revealed to defendants
during discovery).
42. E.g., Blanton v. State, 880 So.2d 798 (Fla. App. 5 Dist 2004) (holding that the
defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was not denied by the admission of the
unavailable child victim's statement to police because the defendant had had the opportunity
to depose the victim, but did not); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004) (holding that the
defendant forfeited his right to confront his victim by killing him); People v. Landers, No.
235918 2004 WL 1089500 at *2 n.3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 13, 2004) (finding, in a footnote, that
Crawford did not bar the admission of a transcript from a grand jury proceeding against one
other than the defendant because, "[t]he defendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment
guarantee to be confronted with the witnesses against him"); Francis v. Duncan, 2004 WL
1878795 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2004) (holding that it was not error to admit a witness's prior
statements when she would not testify at trial because of threatening telephone calls she
received from the defendant).
43. Heard v. Commonwealth, No. 2002-CA-002494-MR, 2004 WL 1367163 (Ky. Ct. App.
June 18, 2004).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at *2.
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by permitting the Commonwealth to introduce the out-of-court
statements made by Angel on the evening of the incident through
the testimony of [her grandmother, the police officer, and the
doctor]."4 The appellate court held that the trial court properly
admitted the victim's statements to her grandmother and treating
physician, based upon the "firmly rooted" hearsay exception
discussed in White v. Illinois.4 8 However, it also held that the trial
court erred in admitting the victim's statements to the police
officer.4 9 In support of its holding, the court specifically discussed
the mandate from Crawford, concluding that, "Crawford dictates
that the admission of [the victim's] statements to Officer Gilbert
implicating Heard as her attacker should not have been admitted
under any exception to the hearsay rule."5"
The appellate court's conclusion that the victim's statements to
the officer could not be admitted as excited utterances, despite the
trial court's correct finding that the victim was under the stress of
the event when she made these statements to the officer, produces
an internally inconsistent result.5' One wonders what result would
have occurred had a neighbor, who happened to be an off-duty police
officer, stopped by and asked the victim what happened. Would the
victim's statements to her neighbor have been excluded as the result
of "police interrogation?" Would the result have been different if
the police officer had responded to the scene, but not posed a single
question? Indeed, the appellate court's ruling encourages police
inaction. The Heard holding plainly illustrates the internally
inconsistent results that arise when courts attempt to interpret the
term "testimonial statement" put forth in Crawford.
These attempts at interpretation have led to inconsistent
results in domestic violence cases across the country. While Indiana
and North Carolina admit the testimony of police officers regarding
a victim's statements at the scene under the "excited utterance"
exception to hearsay,5 2 California has more strictly interpreted the
47. Id.
48. Id. at *3 (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992)).
49. Id. at *4.
50. Id.
51. Id. The jurors were permitted to hear the statements that the victim made to her
grandmother and her doctor, however, the jurors were not permitted to hear the statements
that the victim made to the police officer, although these statements were identical. Id at *4-6.
52. See e.g., Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling that statements
made by a domestic violence victim to an officer at the scene were not testimonial and were
properly admitted as excited utterances); Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that where an officer responded to a domestic disturbance call and the victim
reported what the defendant had done to her, the victim's statements were properly admitted
20051 395
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term "testimonial statement" in domestic violence cases.5" For the
most part, California courts have ruled that a victim's statements
to police officers at the scene of the crime are not admissible as
excited utterances.54 These rulings, misinterpreting the Supreme
Court's holding in Crawford, eviscerate efforts to bring 'victimless'
domestic violence cases to trial.
People v. Kilday55 illustrates this problematic trend in
California courts. In that case, Kilday's girlfriend, Patricia, told
the police "that Kilday had cut her with a shard of glass, burned
her legs, and injured her shoulder and head." Patricia "had visible
physical injuries and was upset, frightened, and [was] initially
unwilling to speak" to the police officers.56 Patricia's first words to
the police were, "I deserve this." During the trial, the jury heard a
as non-testimonial excited utterances); see also Beach v. State, 816 N.E.2d 57 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that any error in the admission of the domestic violence victim's statements
to police officers at the scene was harmless, without deciding whether the statements were
testimonial); State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling that statements,
made by a victim of assault and kidnapping, to police officers right after the incident were
not testimonial because they were excited utterances); cf. State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208
(Me. 2004) (holding that prior statements made by the victim at the police station to report
an assault by her son were properly admitted at her son's murder trial as non-testimonial
statements because they were excited utterances).
53. See, e.g., People v. Lugo, No. E033252, 2004 WL 2092018 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2004)
(holding that a domestic violence victim's statements to a police officer who arrived on the
scene in response to a 911 call were testimonial); People v. Adams, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 237 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2004) (holding that victim's statements given to police officers at a convenience store
were testimonial); People v. Kilday, No. A099095, 2004 WL 1470795 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30,
2004) (holding that statements made by the victim of domestic violence to the police at the
scene were testimonial regardless of the informality of the questioning); see also People v.
Zarazua, No. H025472, 2004 WL 837914 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2004) (holding that the
statements of the victim of rape and domestic battery, who appeared at the police station with
injuries at 4:30 a.m., were testimonial).
54. Of course, inconsistent rulings have resulted within California's own appellate
courts. In a confused holding, the Fourth District Court of Appeals upheld the admission
of the statements of a domestic violence victim who was stabbed by her significant
other. People v. Jiles, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). The victim's statements
identifying her assailant, made approximately one hour before she died, were admitted by
the trial court under the "spontaneous statement" hearsay exception. Id. at 795-96. In
what seems a transparent attempt to reach the right result, the appellate court upheld
the admission of the testimony, but was unclear as to the basis for its holding. Id. It may
have upheld the admission as a spontaneous statement exception to hearsay, or as a
dying declaration, or even on the basis of the "forfeiture by wrongdoing" doctrine, which it
also mentioned briefly. Id. The court stated that, "[rlegardless of whether under Crawford
a spontaneous declaration may be inadmissible in the absence of an opportunity to cross-
examine, under the circumstances in the instant case, [the victim's] statement was
admissible." Id. at 795. In the case of a gang-related shooting, the Sixth District Court of
Appeals held that a 911 call was admissible because the statements to dispatch were not
testimonial. People v. Caudillo, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 574 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
55. No. A099095, 2004 WL 1470795 (Cal. App. June 30, 2004).
56. Id.
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tape recording of Patricia's interview with the police, and the
detective testified regarding Patricia's statements. 7 Patricia did
not testify.5 8
The trial court admitted Patricia's statements pursuant to a
state evidence rule, California "Evidence Code section 1370, which
sets forth a limited exception to the general rule of inadmissibility
of hearsay."59 It interpreted the statute as follows:
Under section 1370, a victim's statement made to law
enforcement personnel, or a recorded statement, which "purports
to narrate, describe, or explain the infliction or threat of
physical injury upon the declarant," made at or near the time
of the injury or threat, is admissible notwithstanding the
hearsay rule if the victim is an "unavailable ... witness" and
if the statement "was made under circumstances that would
indicate its trustworthiness."0
The appellate court reversed the trial court with respect to the
admission of each of Patricia's statements.6 ' Discussing the holding
in Crawford, the appellate court set out to determine whether
Patricia's statements to police officers and Patricia's statements
made on audiotape constituted "testimonial statements."6 2 The
appellate court concluded that "both categories of statements [were]
testimonial."63
In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court relied upon the
language in Crawford, quoting the Supreme Court opinion no fewer
than six times." The California court reasoned that statements
obtained during police interrogations are testimonial not because
an interrogation is formal, structured, or recorded, but because
police interrogations serve an investigative (and potentially
57. Id. at *2, 4. The tape-recorded interview included Patricia's account of four prior
incidents of abuse by Kilday, including an incident, when he cut her with a piece of glass and
when he held her down and burned her with a hot clothing iron. Id. at *2-3.
58. Id. at *2.
59. Id. at *4. Not surprisingly, the history behind the enactment of this rule of evidence
involves domestic violence. After the application of the hearsay rule to exclude the diary of
Nicole Simpson in O.J. Simpson's murder trial, public outcry demanded that this new
evidentiary exception be enacted, virtually tailored to domestic violence prosecution. See
Glenn A. Fait, Victims' Rights Reform - Where Do We Go From Here ? More Than A Modest
Proposal, 33 MOGEORGE L.REv 705, 709 (2002).
60. Kilday, 2004 WL 1470795, at *4 (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 2004).
61. Id.
62. Id. at *6.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id.
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prosecutorial) function.65 According to this reasoning, no statement
a domestic violence victim makes to a police bfficer will ever be
admissible, because the court assumes that police officers always
serve an investigative function. This narrow categorization of the
police officer's function completely ignores the role of the police
officer as a hero66 and protector.6 7 It is incorrect to assume that
police officers always serve as investigators in times of trouble.
In comparing domestic violence cases from various states, it
becomes apparent that the Supreme Court's refusal to articulate a
definition of "testimonial statements" has resulted in irreconcilable
evidentiary rulings.
IV. PROSECUTORS AND LEGISLATORS AT A STANDSTILL
Before the Crawford decision, several states had taken
progressive steps to address the unique aspects of prosecuting
domestic violence cases." Alaska and Colorado had both allowed
for admission of evidence of prior domestic violence incidents in
domestic violence prosecutions.69 Knowing that domestic violence
victims often recant, Illinois, California, and Oregon had allowed
a victim's initial statement to police to be admissible at trial.7 °
65. Id.
66. See NYPD Memorial: 2001 Heroes - World Trade Center Terrorist Attack, available
at http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/nypd/html/memorial.0l.html (depicting officers who gave
their lives to save others on September 11, 2001) (last visited Apr. 16, 2005).
67. Cf. People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004).
A 911 call is typically initiated not by the police, but by the victim of a crime. It
is generated not by the desire of the prosecution or the police to seek evidence
against a particular suspect; rather, the 911 call has its genesis in the urgent
desire of a citizen to be rescued from immediate peril.
Id.
68. There are significant problems associated with cases in which prosecutors attempt to
hold abusers accountable despite recanting and reluctant witnesses.
[B]ecause complainants in domestic violence cases often do not appear for trial,
prosecutors have in recent years increasingly tried to fashion "victimless"
prosecutions. In such a case, the government tries to prove the defendant's guilt
without testimony from the complainant through other evidence. Often
prosecutors attempt to prove such cases in important part by offering certain
out-of-court statements made by the complainant; they ask that such statements
be admitted in evidence pursuant to various exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Id. at 878.
69. In 1997, Alaska added a section to its rules of evidence specifically to permit the
introduction of "evidence of other crimes involving domestic violence by the defendant."
ALASKA R. REv. RULE 404(b)(3) (West 2004). In 1994, Colorado provided for the same type of
evidence to be introduced, albeit via statute. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-801.5 (West 2003).
70. In 2003, by public act, Illinois added a specific statute entitled "Admissibility of prior
statements in domestic violence prosecutions when the witness is unavailable to testify." 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.2a (2004). In 1996, California added a section to its evidence code,
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While the admission of 'other acts' evidence appears, for the most
part, outside the scope of the Crawford holding, the admission
of domestic violence victims' out-of-court statements falls squarely
within Crawford's prohibitions. It is doubtful that the attempts
of states to accommodate reality will survive the Supreme Court's
decree that reality is not the concern of legal scholars.
Justice Scalia could not have been clearer in dismissing the
"run-of-the-mill" realities of 2004 in favor of the Framers' weightier
concerns." He wrote:
By replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with open-
ended balancing tests, we do violence to their design. Vague
standards are manipulable, and, while that might be a small
concern in run-of-the-mill assault prosecutions like this one,
the Framers had an eye toward politically charged cases like
Raleigh's - great state trials where the impartiality of even
those at the highest levels of the judiciary might not be
so clear.72
According to Scalia, when the interests of hundreds of
thousands of "run-of-the-mill" domestic violence victims73 are
pitted against the rare victim of a false treason charge, it is the
latter's rights that the Constitution safeguards, and the former
whom states are virtually powerless to protect. Prosecutors cannot
go forward with 'victimless' prosecutions, and legislators cannot
ameliorate the Court's ignorance or indifference, through reparative
legislation. Under Crawford, when the defendant has not had an
opportunity for prior cross-examination, the admission of the
domestic violence victims' statements will be overturned on appeal
entitled "Threat of infliction of injury," that was specifically tailored to address recanting
victims of domestic violence and admit certain types of reliable hearsay. CAL. EVID. CODE §
1370 (West 2004). Oregon had a separate hearsay exception for "[a] statement that purports
to narrate, describe, report or explain an incident of domestic violence ... made by a victim
of the domestic violence within 24 hours after the incident occurred," if the statement
satisfied certain listed criteria. OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(26)(a) (2003).
71. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1373-74.
72. Id.
73. A wealth of statistics exist that document the public health crisis of domestic violence.
For example, a woman is battered every fifteen seconds in the United States. Andreea
Vesa, International and Regional Standards for Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence, 12
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 309, 358 n.1 (2004) (citing World Bank figures within
a 2000 Amnesty International report). Other statistics estimate an even higher incidence
of battering. Cf Sarah J. Lee, The Search for the Truth: Admitting Evidence of Prior Abuse
in Cases of Domestic Violence, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 221, 229 (1998) (citing a statistic that a
woman is battered once every nine seconds).
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and deemed unconstitutional as a violation of the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser.74
V. THE SMALLEST OF STEPS: RECOGNIZING THAT STATEMENTS
TO MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND EXCITED UTTERANCES ARE
NEVER TESTIMONIAL
The impact of excluding statements to medical personnel is
especially severe for prosecutors when the victim refuses to testify.
Apart from the victim's statements to the physician, there may be
no evidence to establish causation or the identity of the abuser.
Further, if a pretrial motion to admit the victim's statement to an
emergency room physician is denied, the prosecutor may not be
able to appeal the decision. 5
Statements made for the purpose of medical treatment or
diagnosis should be categorically admissible on the grounds that
such statements are never testimonial. Testimonial statements
are those in which the government is involved "with an eye toward
trial."76 Physicians treating those in pain are "not performing
any function remotely resembling that of a Tudor, Stuart, or
Hanoverian justice of the peace."77 Testimonial statements are
statements that possess a certain degree of formality. 8 Statements
made to a medical provider, such as a paramedic, nurse, or
physician, do not possess this requisite formality. In order to
effectively treat the patient's medical condition, the doctor must
encourage the patient to share private and sometimes even
embarrassing information. Formality would reduce the willingness
of a patient to speak candidly; thus, these types of conversations
must be kept informal. Further, testimonial statements have an
underlying purpose of establishing or proving some fact.79 Medical
74. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1366.
75. For example, Idaho would not permit such an appeal. See Idaho Appellate Rule 11 for
a list of dispositions from which one may appeal, which does not include an evidentiary ruling
by the court that certain hearsay statements are inadmissible at trial. IDAHO APPELLATE RULE
11 (2001).
76. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1367 n.7.
77. People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 854 (Cal. Ct. App. July 15, 2004) (holding that
a victim's statement to an emergency room physician was not testimonial); see also State
v. Castilla, 87 P.3d 1211 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (unpublished portion) (upholding the
admission of the victim's statements to a sexual assault examination nurse because "these
statements were not testimonial in nature - they were not elicited by a government official
and were not given with an eye toward trial").
78. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364 (stating that "[a]n accuser who makes a formal
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a
casual remark to an acquaintance does not").
79. See id. at 1364 (defining testimony as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for
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patients do not wish to establish or prove any facts. Patients
answer questions and provide information for the sole purpose of
facilitating their medical care.
In State v. Vaught,8 the Nebraska Supreme Court directly
addressed the medical statements exception to the exclusion of
hearsay after Crawford.81 The court permitted the physician to
repeat the four-year-old victim's statements at trial, over objection
by the defense counsel.8 2 On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court
upheld the admission of this testimony, concluding that it was not
testimonial in nature.' The court relied on the fact that the victim's
identification of the perpetrator was a statement made for the
purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment.84 The court wrote,
"[in the present case, the victim was taken to the hospital by her
family to be examined and the only evidence regarding the purpose
of the medical examination, including the information regarding
the cause of the symptoms, was to obtain medical treatment."8"
The court left open the possibility that a different ruling might
result under a different set of facts. 6
To date, courts have been more consistent in admitting
"statement[s] for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment"
post-Crawford than any other type of statement.87 Courts tend
to exclude the statements of child sexual assault victims as
"testimonial" only when the children made the incriminating
statement to specially trained social workers or police officers,
and not nurses or doctors. 8 Perhaps this very 'police officer
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact") (quoting 1 N. Webster, An American
Dictionary of the English Language (1828)).
80. 682 N.W.2d 284 (Neb. 2004).
81. In Vaught, a four-year-old victim of sexual assault told the examining physician that
"her Uncle D.J. put his finger in her pee-pee." Id. at 286.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 293.
84. See id. at 291.
85. Id. at 291.
86. See id.
87. Id. Accord Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 445 (8th Cir. 2004); People v. Cage, 15
Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 854 (Cal. Ct. App. July 15, 2004) ; Hear v. Commonwealth, No. 2002-CA-
002494-MR, 2004 WL 1367163 (Ky. Ct. App. June 18, 2004).
88. See People v. Espinoza, No. H026266, 2004 WL 1560376 (Cal. Ct. App. July 13, 2004)
(holding that a police officer's videotaped interview of a child sexual assault victim contained
testimonial statements by the child); People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that the admission of child sexual abuse victim's statements to police officer
constituted reversible error); People ex rel R.A.S., No. 03CA1209, 2004 WL 1351383 (Colo. Ct.
App. June 17, 2004) (holding that the admission of statements by a four-year-old sexual
abuse victim to a police officer violated the Confrontation Clause); People v. Vigil, 104
P.3d 258, 2004 WL 1352647 (Colo. Ct. App. June 17, 2004) (finding that a police officer's
videotaped interview of child sexual abuse victim was interrogation and elicited testimonial
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problem' has contributed to the cause of the confusion concerning
the excited utterances exception. 9 As previously mentioned, large
discrepancies have resulted from the courts' attempts to categorize
statements as "excited utterances" made to police officers. Some
courts have held that excited utterances to police officers are
admissible." Other courts have ruled that such statements are
testimonial, and therefore inadmissible. 9' A better approach would
be to recognize that excited utterances should always be deemed
non-testimonial. The Supreme Court's Crawford decision leaves
room for such an interpretation.
92
Hinting at what kinds of statements might be considered
"testimonial," Justice Scalia wrote, "This focus also suggests that
statements despite the fact that the interview was conducted in a relaxed atmosphere
with open-ended questions); Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004)
(holding that the statements of a victim of child abuse to a social worker who used non-
leading questions were testimonial and their admission violated the defendant's right
to confrontation).
89. Cf. Wall v. State, 143 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding that a statement given by
the victim of an aggravated assault in which she identified her attacker to the police was
testimonial even though it was given to the police at the hospital).
90. See, e.g., Leavitt v. Arave, 371 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. June 14, 2004) (holding that
statements from the victim's frantic call to dispatch on the night before the murder were not
testimonial); Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that statements
in response to a domestic disturbance call were properly admitted as non-testimonial excited
utterances); Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that statements to
officer at scene were properly admitted as excited utterances); Heard v. Commonwealth, No.
2002-CA-002494-MR, 2004 WL 1367163 (Ky. Ct. App. June 18, 2004) (holding that the
victim's statements at the scene to her grandmother and a medical professional were not
testimonial, but that the statement to an officer was testimonial because it involved police
interrogation); State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a victim's
statements to police officers right after the incident were not testimonial, as they were excited
utterances); Cassidy v. State, 1619 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that victim's
statements to a police officer at the hospital through an interpreter approximately one hour
after the assault were not testimonial in nature).
91. People v. Adams, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 237 (Cal. App. 3d July 22, 2004) (finding that
victim's statements to police officers at a convenience store that her boyfriend kneed her in
the stomach and lacerated her with glass were testimonial); People v. Kilday, 2004 WL
1470795 (Cal. App. June 30, 2004) (finding that statements made by victim of domestic
violence to the police at the scene of the domestic violence are testimonial regardless of the
informality of the questioning); People v. Lugo, 2004 WL 2092018 (Cal. App. 4th Sept. 2004)
(finding that domestic violence victim's statements to police officer who arrived on scene in
response to 911 call were testimonial).
92. In discussing the "spontaneous declaration" exception, Justice Scalia wrote:
It is questionable whether testimonial statements would ever have been
admissible on that ground in 1791; to the extent the hearsay exception for
spontaneous declarations existed at all, it required that the statements be made
"immediat[ely upon the hurt received, and before [the declarant had time to
devise or contrive any thing for her own advantage."
Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1368 n.8 (citing Thompson v. Trevanion, Skin. 402, 90 Eng. Rep. 179
(KB. 1694)). This requirement comports with states' attempts to legislate the admission of
domestic violence victims' statements made to officers at the scene of the crime.
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not all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment's core concerns.
An off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence and
thus a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it
bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation
Clause targeted."93
An excited utterance is similar to an off-hand or overheard
remark and does not implicate the Sixth Amendment's core
concerns. In a certain sense, there is no more off-hand remark than
one that is made under the excitement of a stressful event. For
the purposes of Sixth Amendment analysis, a statement made
by a bleeding victim identifying her assailant is inherently
trustworthy, regardless of who overhears it. It does not matter if
her cries of distress are heard by a family member, a neighbor, or
a police officer. As Heard demonstrates, attempting to categorize
statements based on the listener produces nonsensical results. 4
The speaker, under the excitement of a stressful event, does not
alter her statement depending on who might be listening, or,
indeed, whether anyone is listening at all.
An excited utterance, by its very nature, bears no resemblance
to the civil law abuses that the Confrontation Clause targeted.9"
In domestic violence cases, many victims attempt to retract the
incriminating excited utterances they made to dispatch personnel
or in the presence of the police - not because the statements are
false, but precisely because they are true.
If we can learn from the Framers' experiences, surely we can
learn from our own. The contrast between a defendant accused of
treason, begging to confront his accuser, and a defendant accused
of domestic battery, hoping he has successfully intimidated his
accuser into failing to appear in court so that the charges will be
dropped, makes painfully apparent how the Crawford decision has
failed to offer protection to victims of domestic violence. The
Supreme Court should affirmatively acknowledge that excited
utterances are never testimonial, and necessarily do not implicate
the core concerns of the Confrontation Clause. Such recognition
would be a step back in the right direction.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is something appealing about viewing the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause in a historical vacuum, as the
93. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364.
94. Heard, 2004 WL 1367163.
95. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364.
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Supreme Court did in Crawford. Always requiring an accuser to
appear seems the most obvious interpretation; indeed, it is so
obvious as to be irrefutable. Unfortunately, as with many perfect
theories, this conceptual framework breaks down in modern day
criminal law practice. While the Framers did not consider the
problem of recanting victims of domestic violence, modern state
courts routinely face this problem.
In attempting to apply the Supreme Court's obscure new Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence to their daily criminal trial dockets,
courts have produced inconsistent and contradictory holdings, with
no unified approach in sight. The most troubling aspect of this
Confrontation Clause 'free-for-all' is the effect that this confusion
has on prosecution of domestic violence cases. Due to the Court's
intentionally obtuse holding, many domestic violence cases will
never be prosecuted.
In the current legal environment, prosecutors do not know
what evidence will be admissible in domestic violence cases.
Trial courts may rule that conversations recorded during 911
telephone calls are testimonial, and may exclude them. Courts may
also exclude a victim's statements to a police officer, a paramedic,
or even the victim's own child. In gambling on pre-trial motions,
prosecutors know that the cards are stacked against them. Of
the cases that are filed, many will be dismissed prior to trial
because of erroneous rulings excluding critical evidence.
Statements for the purpose of medical diagnosis and excited
utterances should never be deemed "testimonial." Until the
United States Supreme Court provides some clarity regarding
what types of evidence are testimonial, trial courts and appellate
courts will continue to make inconsistent rulings that provide
little discernable precedent for future cases. Indeed, in a worst-
case scenario, the Supreme Court's latest interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment actually encourages men to kill their wives
and girlfriends to escape retribution. The Court's recent
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment may render prosecutors
and legislators powerless to stop domestic violence.
